In literature, there is limited direct evidence regarding the effect of health insurance coverage on firm performance and worker productivity. We study the impacts of health insurance on medium-and large-scale domestic private firms' performance and productivity in Vietnam, using a large firm level census dataset. We find statistically, but suggestive, positive health insurance effects on both aggregate profit and profit per worker for both complying and non-complying firms when using the full sample. We further restrict the sample to specific industries. The positive health insurance effects could exist for both complying and non-complying firms in the heavy manufacturing and construction sector, while such positive effects could be only significant for complying firms in the wholesale/retail sectors. We could not find any evidence of positive health insurance effects in the light manufacturing sector. These results imply that the impacts of health insurance could be industry specific.
Introduction
How to achieve universal health coverage has become an important policy issue in advanced, emerging, and developing countries alike. For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO)'s flagship publication, the World Health Report 2013, focuses entirely on "research for universal health coverage" (World Health Organization 2013). The World Bank also released a report titled "Going universal" (Cotlear et al. 2015) .
Vietnam is not an exception and the Law on Health Insurance (enacted in 2008) has proposed a grand design and time line to achieve universal health insurance coverage by 2014. However, the speed of coverage expansion has recently decreased and the coverage rate was 66 % in 2011 (Vietnam Social Security (VSS) (2012)). Moreover, in April 2013, the Viet Nam News (Viet Nam News 2013 :05/24/2013 reported that the newly ratified government proposal demonstrates their changed plan to cover approximately 80 % of the population by 2020.
One of the bottlenecks in universal health coverage in Vietnam is the low coverage rate among employees of domestic private firms. This group is one of the compulsory groups as defined by the government and has to be provided with health insurance through the domestic private firm they work for. Only one monopolistically public health insurance system exists for all employees of domestic private firms, called VSS. 1 However, compulsory does not mean legally enforceable and the coverage rate remained at 53.4 % in 2010 (Vietnam Social Security (VSS) (2011)); there were 11.9 million targeted workers in total, but only 6.3 million workers were covered by health insurance. The contribution rate to health insurance was 3 % of the monthly gross salary (2 % by the employer and 1 % by the employee) until 2009 and increased to 4.5 % (3 % by the employer and 1.5 % by the employee) in 2010.
Stemming from various stakeholders, there are various reasons why health insurance compliance by domestic private firms is far from universal. For instance, the government's ability to enforce the laws is perceived as weak. 2 Some employers may choose not to provide health insurance to save the money spent on the contribution to health insurance premium. As the borrowing conditions are not flexible and accessibility to firm loans is challenging in Vietnam, keeping the health insurance premium unpaid could be a solution to immediately pump more cash into businesses. Alternately, employees may be willing to avoid the deduction of the contribution to health insurance premium from their salaries or may consider that health insurance is not useful. 3 On the other hand, there are reasons why employers are willing to act as health insurance "agents" for their employees (O'Brien 2003) , regardless of the government's weak monitoring ability. Particularly, health insurance may contribute to firms' and workers' productivity as healthy workers are generally more productive in comparison to the unhealthy ones. As workers with health insurance may be more likely to receive treatment for illnesses and injuries, those with health insurance may be less likely to miss work or miss fewer days of work when they do fall ill. In addition to the reason based on the employee health status, there could be some other reasons why some employers may choose to provide health insurance to the employees. This could be that providing health insurance allows firms to attract more productive workers. Furthermore, providing insurance can improve morale, lower turnover, and encourage employees to perform their best-even without directly depending on the employee health status.
Considering this background, the question whether complying with the health insurance related laws makes complying firms better-off or not is ultimately empirical. Surprisingly, there is almost no direct evidence regarding the effect of health insurance coverage on firm performance and worker productivity (O'Brien 2003) . Health insurance has an influence on access to health care, the timeliness of care, the amount and quality of care received, and fundamental health. People without health insurance are less likely to seek medical care and also less likely to receive it; as a result, they are more likely to be in worse health, and have higher death rates, than people with insurance coverage. Uninsured persons have a much greater risk of health deterioration and death, with several studies showing that they are 1.2-1.5 times more likely to die than insured persons (Baker et al. 2001; Franks, Clancy, and Gold 1993; and Sorlie et al. 1994) . These findings from the medical literature remind us of the importance of the effect of health insurance coverage on firm performance and worker productivity through workers' health. While researchers may recognize the importance of the topic, it is very challenging to find the exogenous variations in health insurance provision, such as in this study. For instance, previous literature has largely focused on the U.S. context, which is limited by the fact that the vast majority of large employers (and many small ones) provides health insurance to employees, and thus there is a lack of a control group. 4 One advantage of the Vietnamese data used in this paper is that compliance of providing health insurance is at marginally over half of the firms, which allows for comparisons to be made between the two groups. Hence, our paper quantifies the effects of complying with the health insurance related laws on firm profit and productivity using a large-scale dataset of domestic private firms in Vietnam.
We believe that this study makes a significant contribution to existing literature as several advanced countries adopt employment-based health insurance, and several developing and emerging countries that consider expanding health insurance coverage mimic the mechanism. Vietnam is one of the leading countries, among developing and emerging countries, working rigorously toward universal health coverage, including employment-based health insurance. Therefore, our paper provides an informative picture for the case of a developing or emerging country introducing a similar insurance system.
We use the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) to conduct the analyses. In the survey, the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) collected information on economic activities annually since 2001. More specifically, we use cross section data of 2009 as the amount of contribution by a firm to health insurance for employees is available only in the 2009 dataset. 5 Hence, we use these data to conduct propensity-score matching (PSM). Another feature of our analysis is its focus on medium-and large-scale firms as such firms provide more stable employment over longer periods in comparison to small-and micro-firms. Additionally, all domestic private firms with at least 30 employees were surveyed in the VES 2009, implying that we have a census of mediumand large-scale private domestic firms in Vietnam, which mitigates sampling biases.
We find suggestive positive health insurance effects for both aggregate profit and profit per worker for complying and non-complying medium-and large-scale firms when using the full sample. However, we find that there exists heterogeneous health insurance effects depending on industries and the compliance status of firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly describe the health insurance system in Vietnam; Section 3 depicts the empirical strategies; Section 4 explains the data and reports the first stage probit results; in Section 5, we discuss the estimation results; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background: Brief Description of the Health Insurance System in Vietnam and
Health Insurance Scheme for Non-State Owned Enterprises
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health (MoH) take the initiative for health insurance, along with the government, and VSS is a governmental policy implementing agency. 6 Under VSS, the provincial social security offices are followed by the district offices. Under the provision of district social security offices, pay-agents and collection agents are employed. In order to provide management advice, the provincial health departments of MoH work together with the provincial social security offices. District-level health facilities are also expected to cooperate with provincial and district social security offices. The foundations of Vietnam's health insurance system were established between 1992 and 1998 in order to improve the health of the population. Figure 1 presents the timeline and roadmap of health insurance with universal coverage. Considering health insurance for workers of private domestic firms, Decree No.299/HDBT was issued by the Council of Ministers in 1992, aiming to cover workers at state owned and non-state owned enterprises with more than 10 workers, as well as pensioners, socially disadvantaged people, and staff of international representative organizations in the country. In 2005, Decree No. 63/2005/ND-CP was introduced for the expansion of compulsory enrolment of workers from non-state owned companies with less than 10 employees. Therefore, these two decrees stipulate all the workers of non-state owned companies, particularly the domestic private firms being in the compulsory group. One of the notable characteristics of the health insurance system for workers at non-state owned enterprises is that its registration system is individual-based. This means that only the workers are covered by the health insurance provided by the firms, while their family members are not covered. During the studied period, until 2009, the contribution rate to health insurance was 3 % of the gross income: 2 % by the employer and 1 % by the employee.
The insurance is effective when the insured are provided with medical care at the public health facility whose name appears on his/her health insurance card and at higher-level public health facilities to which he/she is referred. Patients can choose to register at a public health facility of their choice, within the given options by the government (Ministry of Health 2009). In 2009, the co-payments were 20 % for a wage earner when he/she was treated at the medical facility at which they were registered. Many drugs are covered by health insurance and patients can obtain these drugs at the health facilities at which they are registered. Since health insurance only applies to the purchase of drugs in the hospital where the insured are registered, in many cases, patients cannot obtain the drugs that they need. When patients purchase drugs from a private pharmacy, the costs must be covered out-of-pocket (OOP).
If the insured prefer to be treated at other health facilities, they must make the payment directly to the hospital and the OOP costs are reimbursed later at their place of residence, except in cases of emergency. In the case of an emergency, treatment is provided free of charge.
Empirical Strategies
In this section, we estimate the impact of firms' complying with the health insurance related laws on firm performance and productivity, using PSM methods. We estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and average treatment effect on untreated (ATU). ATT computes the average difference in the outcomes of the firms complying with the health insurance related laws, with and without health insurance provision.
ATU computes the average difference in outcomes of the firms not complying with the health insurance related laws, with and without health insurance provision.
The formula for ATT is given by:
where E (⋅) denotes an expectation operator, 1 is an outcome of interest for a firm i with health insurance provision to the employees, 0 is the outcome of the same firm without health insurance provision to the employees, and is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if the firm complies with the health insurance related laws (contributes to health insurance premiums for the employees) and 0 otherwise. The fundamental problem with estimating eq. (1) is that it is impossible to observe the outcome of firms with health insurance provision for the employees, if they did not provide health insurance, that is E ( 0 | = 1).
For our primary estimator, we use PSM, which was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , with added controls to eliminate the bias. PSM relies on an assumption of conditional independence, where conditional on the probability of a firm complying with the health insurance related laws given the observable covariates, an outcome of interest in the absence of treatment, 0 , and complying with the health insurance related laws, , are statistically independent. This leads to:
where ( ) denotes the probability of the firm contributing to health insurance premiums for the employees given characteristic x, which is defined as:
Therefore, PSM eliminates the bias that could otherwise result from the selection of observed characteristics. Another important assumption of PSM is the common support condition, which requires substantial overlap in covariates between firms complying with the health insurance related laws and those not complying, such that firms being compared have a common probability of being both complying or not.
If these two assumptions are fulfilled, the PSM estimator for ATT can be specified as the mean difference of the firms contributing to health insurance premiums for the employees matched with those not who are balanced on the propensity scores and fall within the region of common support, expressed as follows:
This PSM estimator yields consistent estimators of the ATT, if covariate x accurately characterizes the firms providing health insurance. Therefore, the selection of x is important. It is recommended that all factors affecting the decision on providing health insurance and outcomes should be included (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . With similar analogies, we can estimate . A key limitation of the PSM method is that if unobservable factors affect the decision of contributing to health insurance premiums for employees, the estimated PSM estimators may be biased by the selection of those unobservables (Smith and Todd 2005) . There is a hidden bias if two units with the same values on observable characteristics have different probabilities of receiving the treatment owing to unobserved covariates. The chief executive officer's characteristics, which are not available in the data, may play an important role in the decision on health insurance provision. Alternatively, it is virtually impossible to control for all relevant unobservables.
Therefore, we test whether the unobservables affect the estimated results by using the sensitivity tests proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) . Rosenbaum's method of sensitivity analysis relies on the sensitivity parameter Γ, which measures the degree of departure from the random assignment of treatment. If is the probability of treatment for unit j, that is, the probability of firm providing health insurance to workers in our study, then the odds that unit j receives the treatment is / (1 − ). A similar process can be set up for unit k. The method examines how a large difference between the two odds, the odds ratio, would lead to a change in our basic inference. Rosenbaum (2002) showed that the odds ratio of units with the same value of , which are covariates for the probability that a unit receives a treatment (providing health insurance to workers in our context), is given by:
for all j and k with = . If Γ takes the value of one, it implies that the odds ratio of treatment is the same and the study is free of hidden bias. A value of 2 for Γ implies that the two units that have the same values of could differ in their odds of receiving treatment by as much as a factor of 2. While the values of Γ are unknown, we can attempt to find several values of Γ and observe if the conclusions of the study change. The fundamental process for a sensitivity analysis is as follows. First, we select a series of values for Γ. Next, we observe how the magnitude of the treatment effect changes with increasing values of Γ (Keele 2010) . The larger the critical value of Γ, the less sensitive are the findings based on the observables-to-hidden bias. Hence, in the tables showing PSM results (Table 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9) , the lowest critical values of Rosenbaum bounds producing a 95 % confidence interval that encompasses 0 are reported.
Data and Propensity Score Estimation

Data
We use the data provided by the VES. Since 2001, the GSO has collected information on the economic activities of the preceding year of each business identity countrywide and annually. Although the sampling methods are different for each year for the private firms, GSO has continued to conduct a census of all private firms with more than 30 employees between 2000 and 2009. There are several complex sampling criteria in 2009 data if the number of employees is less than 30. First, given the rapid increase and large number of firms, 15 % random sampling was conducted for private firms with less than 30 employees in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh provinces. Second, 15 % random sampling was conducted for private firms with less than 10 employees. Third, in 18 provinces with less than 1,000 firms, a census was conducted, regardless of firm size. Fourth, a census was conducted for the following sectors: agriculture, forestry, aquaculture, transportation, hotel, tourism, finance, credit, and insurance. We attempted to construct the corresponding weights, but it was impossible to finalize on a convincing set of weights. Therefore, we decided to use only the census of firms with more than 30 employees. By using this sample, our focus is on the effects of health insurance on medium-and large-scale firms' performance and productivity. The data set contains information on the total annual contribution amounts to pension, health insurance, and trade-unions. However, the breakdown of these categories is only available in the 2009 data, as only this data includes the information on whether a firm actually contributed to health insurance premiums for its employees. Therefore, we exclusively use the 2009 data. If a firm reports a positive amount contributed to health insurance premiums for employees on the balance sheet, it is included in the treatment group. On the other hand, if a firm reports no contribution, it is included in the control group. 7 We define a domestic private firm as a firm that does not have partial capital from the state or foreign affiliates. We also exclude collective business firms. Additionally, VES contains general information about domestic private firms, such as type of economic activities, profit, output, employment, assets, and liabilities. This information is derived directly from the balance sheet. In addition, more information, such as firm's age (years of operation), owner/director's age, and gender is available. After deleting outliers and observations with missing crucial information, the total sample size of the domestic private firms whose number of employees is more than 30 is 19,323. 8 The number of complying firms is 10,812 and that of non-complying firms is 8,511. As outcome variables, we use profit after tax deduction and profit after tax deduction per employee. As profit could take a negative value, we did not log the profit variables. The unit of measurement is million Vietnamese dong (VND).
We include the log of capital, share of long-term assets, log of the number of employees, log of the average wage per worker, debt-asset ratio, firm's years of operation, owner/directors' age and gender, 27 industry dummies, and 63 province dummies as regressors in the first stage of probit. The descriptive statistics of the outcome variables and regressors in the first stage probit are shown in Table  1 . The average profit after tax deduction is VND 466.3 million (i. e., USD 27,324.6 in 2009 nominal terms).
10 The average profit after tax deduction per employee is VND 4.7 million (USD 276.3). These values appear small as there are numerous firms with negative profits after tax deduction. Indeed, more than 10 % of the firms run accounting deficits. In the sample, 56 % of the firms contribute to health insurance premiums for their employees. In other words, more than 40 % of the firms do not comply with the health insurance related laws. The average capital stock is VND 11,263 million (=exp(9.329)) and the average share of the long term assets is 0.335. The average number of employees is approximately 65 (=exp(4.175)) and the average wage per worker is VND 25.3 million. The average debt-asset ratio is 0.532 and the average firm's years of operation is 6 years. The average age of the owner/director is 44.9 years and 80 % of them are male. Note: 27 industry and 63 province dummies are omitted. Table 2 reports the unconditional differences in outcome variables and regressors in the first stage probit. Note that the outcome variables and firm characteristics, except the share of long-term assets, are significantly different at the mean between the complying firms and non-complying firms. In all the variables except the share of long-term assets and ratio of male owner/director, the former group has higher values in comparison to the latter, and the differences are statistically significant. However, it is unclear in Table 2 whether this reflects favorable profit impacts of health insurance or the ex-ante attributes of complying firms that make them betteroff in comparison to the non-complying firms, irrespective of health insurance. Table 3 reports the estimation results of the first stage probit estimation. The binary dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm contributes to health insurance premiums and 0 otherwise. We emphasize that the objective of this first stage probit is to balance the important observable covariates underlying health insurance provision between firms complying with health insurance related laws and those not complying, not to establish causal relationships between covariates and contribution to health insurance premiums. Therefore, we caution against the causal interpretation of the results presented in Table 3 . For example, subtle forms of endogeneity may affect some covariates. In other words, any endogenous components of these regressors generate a correlation between the covariates and error term akin to the selection-on-unobservables problem. Therefore, tests for the robustness of results considering prospective selection-on-unobservables provide an effective check on the qualitative impact findings, even if some of the first stage regressors are endogenous. Several main regressors are statistically significant; namely, log of capital, share of long-term assets, log of the number of employees, and log of the average wage and firm's years of operation. However, owner/directors' information and debt-asset ratio are not statistically significant. Although not shown, many of the province and industry dummies are statistically significant. 11 Subsequently, the propensity score for each observation is constructed using the parameters obtained by the probit estimation.
Estimation of Propensity Scores
Before we proceed with the actual PSM estimators, the joint support is estimated such that the treatment groups and control group are comparable. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the propensity score by treatment status. The figure confirms that the treatment groups and control group are comparable. Further, the PSM estimator is implemented. Table 4 reports the PSM estimation results for total profit after tax deduction. As matching algorithms, we use (1) nearest five, (2) radius of 0.001, and (3) a kernel (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth is 0.06) matching. This is to check whether the results are robust to various matching algorithms. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping with 500 replications. For ATT and ATU, we show the results using the mentioned matching algorithms. For each result, we show the result of the balancing and sensitivity tests, where the latter is proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) . There are several findings. First, observing the results of ATT, the firms complying with the health insurance related laws become better-off rather than those not complying. More specifically, profit increases by VND 177-213 million, depending on the matching algorithm. Subsequently, observing ATU, we find a positive effect of a firm's contribution to health insurance premiums for the employees on profit of firms not currently complying with health insurance related laws. As such, profit increases by VND 58-66 million, depending on the matching algorithm. Consequently, the magnitude of ATU is significantly smaller than that of ATT. However, given that non-complying firms are, on an average, small in terms of total profit after tax deduction (VND 210.5 million as per Table 2 ), the profit gain could be 27 % to 31 %. This implies that these firms could improve their performance if they contribute to health insurance premium for the employees. Combining the results of ATT and ATU, we claim that contributing to health insurance premiums for the employees makes medium-and large-scale firms in Vietnam better-off.
Results
Overall Results
We perform a series of balancing tests on the differences in means to investigate whether the matched noncomplying firms have characteristics similar to the matched complying firms in the case of ATT, and whether the matched complying firms have characteristics similar to the matched non-complying firms in the case of ATU. As Appendix A shows, no main variables are statistically different at the 10 % level after matching. The p-values of the likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all the regressors from the probit estimation of the propensity score in Table 4 show that the matching procedures are successful in generating comparison groups to infer the causal impact of health insurance, controlling for observable characteristics. Table 4 also shows the Rosenbaum bounds test of critical values for each matching estimate to be statistically significant and different from 0. For instance, the lowest critical value producing a 95 % confidence interval encompassing 0 is 1.2 for all the ATT estimates. Although there is no clear-cut critical threshold that distinguishes the existence and non-existence of hidden bias, larger is the critical value, less sensitive are the findings based on observables to hidden bias (Rosenbaum 2002) . Based on the estimated critical values, we consider our ATU results relatively less sensitive to bias, based on selection-on-unobservables. These facts are very encouraging as they provide relatively solid evidence that currently non-complying firms could become better-off by providing health insurance to their employees. However, our ATT results should be interpreted with greater caution as the findings may be sensitive to estimator choice and to the omission of relevant unobserved characteristics of firms.
PSM estimation results for profit after tax deduction per employee are also shown in Table 4 . We interpret this as one measure of (labor) productivity. As the results clearly show, the productivity gain is statistically significant for both ATT and ATU. In terms of magnitude, the productivity gain is approximately VND 1.4 million for the firms complying with health insurance related laws and VND 0.6-0.8 million for those not complying. This implies that the average labor productivity of medium-and large-scale firms increases by contributing to health insurance premiums for the employees. Although the magnitude of ATU (VND 0.6-0.8 million, which corresponds to USD 35.2-46.9) appears small, this gain implies that labor productivity of non-complying firms increases by 19 % to 25 % as the labor productivity of non-complying firms is much lower than that of complying firms. On the other hand, as the contribution rate of the employer is 2 % of the wages, the insurance premium that a non-complying firm must bear for one worker is approximately VND 0.46 million, when we use the average wage of non-complying firms of approximately VND 23 million (=exp (3.13), as per Table 2 ). Hence, the additional productivity gain by contributing to health insurance premiums for employees (VND 0.6-0.8 million) and the cost for that gain are not significantly different. Considering the critical values of the Rosenbaum bounds tests, our ATU results are relatively less sensitive to bias based on selection-on-unobservables, while our ATT results should be interpreted with greater caution as those findings may be sensitive to estimator choice and to the omission of relevant unobserved characteristics of firms.
In summary, although we require caution in interpreting the ATT results due to their sensitivity to selectionon-unobservables, we find positive health insurance effects for both aggregate profit and profit per worker for complying and non-complying medium-and large-scale firms. These results are robust in terms of statistical significance, with several matching algorithms under sufficiently balanced samples.
While the empirical findings so far are statistically robust, the importance of the underlying assumption of selection on observables must be emphasized. Consider employee health for instance. If the employees of a firm are on an average healthy, and the insurance premium does not depend on health, firms with healthy employees may be less inclined to buy health insurance for them, but would simultaneously be more productive. If this is the case, the current approach actually underestimates the true effect of health insurance. In another example, an owner's unobservable characteristics positively influence both health insurance provision and firm performance. In this case, we overestimate the true effect of health insurance. Thus, the results should be interpreted as suggestive because our identification strategy, PSM, cannot efficiently deal with such cases.
Results by Industry
Hitherto, we pool all the industries for estimations. However, the impacts of health insurance could be industry specific. Table 5 shows the general industrial structure of medium-and large-scale firms in Vietnam, in which we reclassify the manufacturing sector into light and heavy. The table also shows the share of firms paying health insurance premiums for employees in different industries. Light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, construction, and wholesale/retail are the four representative sectors. Here, we estimate the PSM specifications for each of these four groups. 12 We re-estimate the propensity scores using group specific samples, respectively. 13 Table 6 , 7, 8 and 9 report the estimation results for the light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, construction, and wholesale/retail sectors, respectively. Consequently, clear differences emerge. 
Notes:
The sample size is 5,175 (2,479 complying and 2,696 non-complying firms). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0. 
The sample size is 2,979 (1,903 complying and 1,076 non-complying firms). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0. In Table 6 , we do not find any positive health insurance effect for aggregate profit on both complying and non-complying firms in the light manufacturing sector, and neither is the estimated effect significantly different from 0. Further, the effect on the profit per worker is not different from 0 for both complying and non-complying firms. One plausible reason why the results are different from those in the full sample for this sector is that the light manufacturing sector in Vietnam may be intensively using manual workers who are easily trainable within a few days or weeks, and the work is simple and relatively non-harmful for employees. Therefore, the additional profit gain through contribution to health insurance premium is negligible. Alternatively, employers can also easily replace workers as such workers are abundant. Hence, employers do not necessarily have to provide health insurance to improve morale and lower turnover of workers.
Meanwhile, observing the results of ATT in the heavy manufacturing sector (Table 7) , firms complying with health insurance related laws become better-off than those not complying. More specifically, profit increases by VND 199-252 million, depending on the matching algorithm. Notably, the positive health insurance effects are statistically significant for both aggregate profit and profit per worker, for non-complying firms. A plausible reason is that contrary to the light manufacturing sector, we expect physical health to be an important component of productivity in the heavy manufacturing sector. In addition, factory employees in the heavy manufacturing sector are more likely to face higher risk, which can induce poor health conditions. This implies that providing health insurance to employees is beneficial for firms as healthy workers are generally more productive in comparison to unhealthy ones. Further, as their skills develop over a significant amount of time, instant replacement of employees is very challenging. In such a situation, providing insurance can improve the morale and lower the turnover of workers.
We observe a similar pattern in the construction sector (Table 8 ). The positive health insurance effects are statistically significant for both aggregate profit and profit per worker in both complying and non-complying firms. Similar to the heavy manufacturing sector, physical health is an important component of productivity in the construction sector. Therefore, complying with health insurance related laws enhances profit and productivity in this sector.
The results of the wholesale/retail sector (Table 9 ) are perhaps the most typically expected results a priori. The positive health insurance effects are statistically significant for both aggregate profit and profit per worker for only complying firms. We can interpret this as follows: firms that expect positive health insurance effects self-select into the decision of providing health insurance to employees, while those that do not expect positive effects do not self-select. Indeed, the magnitudes of estimated ATT and ATU are significantly different for both aggregate profit and profit per worker, and all the estimated ATU are statistically insignificant. Further, work in this sector is relatively non-harmful for employees; therefore, physical health may not be an important consideration for employers.
In summary, whether health insurance has positive effects on aggregate profit and profit per worker may depend on the effect (ATT or ATU) of the industry of interest. There is some degree of heterogeneity among industries. The full sample results in Table 4 may mask this aspect. To a certain extent, we understand the types of mechanisms, physical health of employees, and self-selection by firms, from the industry specific results.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper, we quantify the effects of complying with health insurance related laws on profit and productivity by using a large-scale dataset of private firms in Vietnam, focusing on medium-and large-scale firms. We find positive, but suggestive, health insurance effects for both aggregate profit and profit per worker for complying and non-complying medium-and large-scale firms when using the full sample. However, the full sample results may mask some degree of heterogeneous health insurance effects among industries. The positive health insurance effects are statistically significant for both aggregate profit and profit per worker, for both complying and non-complying firms in the heavy manufacturing and construction sector, while such positive effects are only significant for complying firms in the wholesale/retail sector. No positive health insurance effects exist in the light manufacturing sector.
Considering the results by industry, the government may be able to easily encourage some industries to contribute to health insurance premiums for their employees as it is profitable and productivity enhancing for such industries. On the other hand, the government may find it challenging to encourage some non-complying firms in some industries to comply with health insurance related laws because health insurance may not necessarily enhance profit and productivity.
Although we believe our attempt in this paper is an important initial step toward understanding the effects of health insurance on firms' performance and productivity, many issues remain unsolved. First, we completely ignore small firms in this paper due to the complexity of the VES sampling scheme. However, given that a large number of firms have less than 30 employees, we need to study the health insurance effect on relatively small firms. Second, in future studies, we may have to take into account the issue of partial compliance. In this paper, we classify a firm into the treatment group if the firm has contributed to health insurance premiums. However, some firms may decide to pay health insurance premiums for only a fraction of their employees. Due to data limitations, we could not consider this possibility in this paper, but this issue is an important future research topic. Third, we believe that health insurance effect on employment is an important research area. In this paper, we treat the number of employees as a covariate rather than as an outcome. However, given the concept that health insurance provision is a type of labor regulation, its employment effect is an important margin to be investigated, particularly if one is interested in the general equilibrium effect. Fourth, in this study, we analyze the health insurance effect as if the supply side of the health sector were given, although provincial dummies are included in the first stage probit. 14 However, the quality of health services people can receive could significantly influence both a firm's decision of contributing to health insurance premiums and the effects of health insurance on various margins. We believe a study incorporating the supply side of the health sector would be fruitful. Finally, we have to mention both internal and external validities. In relation to internal validity, although we examine whether biases based on selection-on-unobservables exist and whether the samples are considered sufficiently balanced, biases could still remain as our study uses non-experimental data. In relation to external validity, the health insurance system substantially differs across countries. Similar studies in other country contexts are definitely informative. Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses for means and standard errors are in parentheses for the difference in mean. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 27 industry and 63 province dummies are omitted.
A Balancing test of propensity score estimations
Notes
1 Although some healthcare packages are available as additional healthcare premium for workers, they are limited to certain hospitals in large cities and there is no other national agent for health insurance, which is a contrast to what is popular in other countries. 2 For instance, the reports of Vietnam Social Security (VSS) (2010, 2011, and 2012) do not mention at all penalties in the case a firm does not observe the Law on Health Insurance. Moreover, it is not very clear who is in charge of auditing private firms. 3 For example, this could be owing to the fear that getting reimbursed by health insurance agencies is challenging. Conversely, this could be owing to the discrimination in terms of public clinic/hospital treatment against health insurance holders. The existence of a voluntary paying system provides priority to patients who pay higher fees in order to gain faster access to health services in public clinics/hospitals. The long queue for health checks for health insurance holders with limitedly available facilities and health service, prevents employees from holding health insurance. 4 See Currie and Madrian (1999) for a comprehensive review on health insurance and the labor market in U.S. They survey the literature to explore the relationship between health insurance and employment, hours worked, wage, and job turn-over among others. For more recent studies, see Gibson, Fendrick, and Chernew (2012) and Aizawa and Fang (2013) for instance. 5 In all other years, only the sum of the contribution amounts to health insurance, pension, and unions is available, which makes it challenging for us to judge whether a firm indeed contributed to health insurance premiums for its employees. 6 See Matsushima and Yamada (2014) for a more detailed description. 7 The problem concerning grouping is tackled in the conclusion section. 8 The original census of private domestic firms with more than 30 employees is approximately 21,000. 9 The list of the 27 industries and their sample size are shown in Table 5 . 10 The official exchange rate in 2009 (annual average based on monthly averages) was VND 17,065.1 per USD (World Bank 2015).
